



Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true
because the rose is red.Onemight say aswell that the proposition that the rose
is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not
commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is
no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose
is, and how the rose is is not an entity over and above the rose.
Although expressed in other terms, this view has been held by various
authors, like David Lewis (1992, 2001a) and Julian Dodd (2002). It is
against this view that I shall argue in this paper. I shall argue that a sig-
nificant class of true propositions, including inessential predications like the
proposition that the rose is red, are made true by entities.
No truthmaking without truthmakers is my slogan. Although I have my
view about what kinds of entities are truthmakers, I shall not argue for or
presuppose that view here.1 All I shall argue for here is that if a proposition
is made true by something, it is made true by some thing, but my argument
will leave it open what kind of thing that thing is: it could be a fact or state of
affairs, a trope, or any other sort of entity.2
I shall presuppose that truthbearers are propositions. The arguments for
taking propositions as truthbearers are well known, as well as their strengths
and weaknesses. But I am not begging any question by adopting this presup-
position, since it is a presupposition that seems to be shared by the opposition.
2. THE TRUTHMAKER PRINCIPLE
A truthmaker is an entity that makes true a proposition. That is, a truth-
maker is an entity in virtue of which a certain proposition is true. By the
1 Succinctly, my view is that truthmakers of propositions like that a is F are facts (or states of
affairs), whose all and only constituents are resembling particulars. See my 2002: 53–4, 85–7,
113–21. (Note that there I took sentences rather than propositions to be truthbearers).
2 I am using the words ‘entity’ and ‘thing’ interchangeably. I shall use them so throughout the
paper.
truthmaker principle I shall understand the claim that necessarily the
members of an important class of synthetic true propositions, including
inessential predications, have truthmakers.3 So what I shall argue for is the
truthmaker principle (TM):
(TM) Necessarily, if hpi is true, then there is some entity in virtue of
which it is true.4
Since my thesis is not that all truths, but that a class of synthetic true pro-
positions including inessential predications have truthmakers, in (TM) ‘hpi’
should be considered to stand for such truths, not for any truth whatsoever.
But for the sake of simplicity and ease of exposition I shall usually speak
of propositions in general—the reader should understand that I am referring
to this class of synthetic propositions that includes inessential predications.
In virtue of is a primitive notion, not reducible to notions like entailment.
Yet that it is primitive does not mean that it is unclear. One can clarify
what it means by specifying which propositions are true in virtue of which
entities.5 And although in virtue of is not reducible to entailment, there
are connections between the two notions. In particular, if hpi is true in
virtue of entity e, then he existsi entails hpi. If so e necessitates hpi in the
sense that there is no possible world where e exists but in which hpi is not
true. Thus, according to (TM), necessarily, if a proposition is true, there is
some entity that necessitates it.
But before arguing for (TM), I shall consider two other principles that
have been thought to capture the idea that truths have truthmakers. Pro-
blems with finding truthmakers for negative existentials led John Bigelow
(1988a: 133) to replace (TM) by the following supervenience principle:
(ST) Necessarily if hpi is true, then either at least one entity exists
which would not exist, were hpi false, or at least one entity does not
exist which would exist, were hpi false.6
Assuming possible worlds, (ST) can be expressed as follows:
(ST*) For every possible world w, w*, and every proposition hpi, if w
and w* contain exactly the same entities, then hpi is true in w if and
only if hpi is true in w*.
3 Remarking that I take inessential predications to have truthmakers is important because some
foes of truthmakers like Dodd (2002: 72) accept that essential predications and existential pro-
positions have entities as truthmakers.
4 I follow the usual custom of letting ‘hpi’ stand for ‘the proposition that p’.
5 I explained the notion of truthmakers in that way in my (2002: 35–40).
6 This is not exactly the way Bigelow formulates his principle, but the differences are irrelevant.
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(ST) and (ST*) are supervenience principles for they make truth supervene
upon being. In particular they make truth supervene upon what entities
exist: once you fix what entities exist in a certain world, you have thereby
fixed what propositions are true in that world.
Although less controversial than (TM), (ST) and (ST*) also have met
resistance. Dodd (2002) argues that (ST) lacks motivation and that there is
no good reason to believe in it. And Lewis (2001a) also has proposed to
abandon (ST).
I do not propose to abandon (ST) and (ST*). Nevertheless I do reject the
idea, presupposed by both proponents and opponents of (ST) and (ST*),
that these principles capture the idea that truths have truthmakers. For
implicit in the idea of truthmakers there is an important asymmetry, namely
that while entities make propositions true, true propositions do not make
entities exist.
But the supervenience between truth and being goes both ways: truth and
being supervene upon each other. Thus, in the case of (ST*), the following
also holds: there are no two possible worlds in which exactly the same
propositions are true but which differ as to the entities that exist in them:
once you fix what propositions are true in a certain world, you have thereby
fixed what entities exist in that world.
Similarly for (ST): necessarily if a certain entity e exists, then there is some
true proposition, namely that e exists, that would be false were e not to exist
(and some false proposition, namely that e does not exist, that would be true
were e not to exist).
Thus principles (ST) and (ST*) do not capture the idea that truths
have truthmakers. There is more to truthmaking than the idea that truth
supervenes upon being. So (ST) and (ST*) are not what the friends of
truthmakers should propose or defend.
But although truthmaking is more than the supervenience of truth upon
being, the supervenience principles follow from (TM). If there can’t be
a truth without a truthmaker, then there can’t be two worlds with the same
entities but in which different propositions are true. Thus (ST*) follows
from (TM). Similarly, if there can’t be a truth without a truthmaker, if a
proposition is true there must be an entity that would not have existed if the
proposition in question had been false. Thus (ST) follows from (TM).
3. DODD AGAINST THE TRUTHMAKER PRINCIPLE
As I said, Dodd argues that (ST) lacks sound motivation. But even if (ST)
does not capture the idea that truths have truthmakers, I have to meet
Dodd’s challenge. For if (ST) is wrong, then so is (TM), which entails it.
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Dodd challenges (ST) with a simple counter-example. Imagine a worldw1
in which a certain rose is red. In that world the proposition that the rose is
red is true. Now imagine a possible world w2, where exactly the same
entities as in w1 exist, but in which the rose in question is white. In w2 the
proposition that the rose is red is false. These worlds, if possible, are a
counter-example to (ST), for they are ontologically equivalent—exactly the
same entities, other than propositions, exist in them—but the proposition
that the rose is red is true in w1 and false in w2.
Dodd’s counter-example is not based on a nominalistic stance. One may
be a full realist about properties and so believe in the existence of properties
over and above particular things like roses. If so, the proposition that the
rose is red is true just in case the rose instantiates the property of being red,
or the universal redness. One may even believe in the relation of instantia-
tion as an entity over and above the particulars and the properties they
instantiate. But, Dodd argues, it does not follow from the fact that the rose
instantiates the property of being red that there is a further entity, over and
above the rose, the property of being red, and the relation of instantiation,
namely the fact or state of affairs that the rose is red.
So even if the properties of being red and being white, and the relation of
instantiation exist both inw1 andw2, these two worlds constitute a counter-
example to (ST). For they contain the same entities but different proposi-
tions are true in them. So what the worlds show is that truth does not
supervene upon what entities exist or, what is the same, that truth does not
supervene upon whether things are. And so (TM) must go, for (TM) makes
truth depend on, and supervene upon, what entities exist.
Yet the counter-example is consistent with a weaker supervenience of
truth upon being: the supervenience of truth upon how things are. For
there is no possible world wn in which things are as they are in w1 but
which differs fromw1 as to what is true in it. In effect, although Dodd rejects
that truth supervenes upon whether things are, he accepts that truth
supervenes upon how things are. A similar conclusion is reached by Lewis
(1992: 204–6; 2001a: 612–14).
4. TRUTH IS GROUNDED
This shows that (TM) is in need of justification. How can we justify it? One
way would be to derive it from a plausible and compelling idea. And this is
what I shall do.
For the root of the idea of truthmakers is the very plausible and
compelling idea that the truth of a proposition is a function of, or is deter-
mined by, reality. Thus suppose that the proposition that the rose is red,
which makes reference to a particular rose, is true. Then the truth of this
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proposition is a function of reality in the sense that the truth of the pro-
position is determined by reality or a portion of it. Indeed, it is a relevant
portion of reality, namely the rose, or perhaps that the rose is red, that
determines the truth of the proposition.
Thus the insight behind the idea of truthmakers is that truth is grounded.
In other words, truth is not primitive. If a certain proposition is true, then it
owes its truth to something else: its truth is not a primitive, brute, ultimate
fact. The truth of a proposition thus depends on what reality, and in par-
ticular its subject matter, is like. What reality is like is anterior to the truth of
the proposition, it gives rise to the truth of the proposition and thereby
accounts for it.7
Thus the idea that truth is determined by reality sounds grand, but in itself
it is a very minimal idea: it is simply the idea that the truth of a truthbearer is
determined by its subject matter, or some feature of it, no matter what the
nature of the subject matter may be.
That truth is determined by reality is a compelling idea, especially when
one notes that it does not commit to any kind of substantive realism. For
idealists can accept that truth is determined by reality—they will simply add
that this reality is not mind-independent or language-independent.
There is an asymmetry implicit in the idea that truth is grounded, namely
that while the truth of a proposition is grounded in reality, reality is not
grounded in the truth of propositions. Thus although the truth of the pro-
position that the rose is red is determined by the rose’s being red, the rose’s
being red is not determined by the truth of the proposition that the rose
is red. One explains the truth of the proposition that the rose is red in terms
of the rose’s being red but not vice versa.
The idea that truth is grounded in reality can be expressed in many dif-
ferent ways. One can say, as I have now been doing it, that the truth of a
proposition is determined by reality. But one can also say that a proposition
is true in virtue of reality, or in virtue of what reality is like, or because of
reality. For instance, the proposition that the rose is red is true in virtue of
what reality is like, namely that the rose is red or the rose’s being red, and it
is true because the rose is red. I take all these locutions to express the idea
that the truth of the proposition that the rose is red is grounded, but from
now on I shall use mainly the formulation in terms of ‘because’.
7 This is not true of all propositions. The truth of the proposition that bachelors are not
married does not depend on what reality is like—whatever reality is like, bachelors are not
married. In general analytic propositions are not grounded in reality. And there may be some
non-analytic truths that are not grounded in reality. Nevertheless a vast number of synthetic
truths, like the truth that the rose is red, are grounded in reality. But since, as I have said, my
aim here is not to defend the idea that all truths have truthmakers, but only that a significant class
of them, including inessential predications, have, that some truths are not grounded will not affect
my thesis.
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5. AGAINST THE PRIMITIVENESS OF TRUTH
The idea that truth is grounded is so compelling that has seemed acceptable
to philosophers like W. V. Quine, Paul Horwich, and Crispin Wright, who
cannot be suspected of trying to advance the cause of truthmakers.8
The plausibility of truth’s being grounded in reality is better appreciated
when one compares it with the alternatives. For suppose truth was primitive.
If so, the following are different possibilities: (a) the truth of the proposition
that the rose is red and the rose’s being red have nothing to do with each
other, and (b) the rose is red because the proposition that the rose is red
is true.
(a) is not good. Surely, the rose’s being red and the truth of the pro-
position that the rose is red are connected in some way. The proposition that
the rose is red is about the colour of the rose, and so if it is true, it must have
to do with the rose’s being red.
But (b) is not better than (a). The idea that the colour of the rose depends
on the truth of a certain proposition about the rose, duly generalized,
commits us to a radical semantic idealism in which reality depends on truth.
Propositions, on this account, would be reality-makers and to make the
rose red one should just try to make the proposition that the rose is red
true. There is no support for either (a) or (b), and there is a lot of evidence
against them.
There is a third alternative that consists in the idea that truth is grounded
in reality and vice versa. There are a few cases in which the truth of a
proposition depends on its subject matter and vice versa. One such case is
the proposition hthis proposition is truei. If true, it is true because of what its
subject matter is like, i.e. because hthis proposition is truei is true. But if its
subject matter is true, it is what it is like, namely true, because the pro-
position hthis proposition is truei is true.
But putting this and similar cases aside, in the vast majority of cases
the truth of a proposition determines in no way its subject matter. All
truths about our rose and all flowers, as well as all truths about non-
truthbearers are like that: their truth depends on what their subject matter is
like without their subject matter depending in any way on whether they are
true or not.9
8 Quine (1970: 10), Horwich (1998: 105), andWright (1992: 26) accept that ‘snow is white’, or
the proposition that snow is white, is true because snow is white and try to explain this in terms of
their respective theories of truth.
9 The case of hthis proposition is truei shows that strictly speaking grounding is a non-
symmetrical relation rather than an asymmetrical one. But since I am not interested in cases like
these I shall continue to speak as if grounding were asymmetrical.
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6. WHY TRUTHMAKERS, I
Yet it seems that the idea that truth is grounded in and determined by reality
is insufficient to ground (TM). For while what (TM) requires is that truth is
determined by whether things are, that truth is grounded in and determined
by reality is compatible with truth’s being grounded in how things are, not
in whether things are. Thus, it seems, Dodd’s counter-example undermines
the controversial (TM) but leaves untouched the uncontroversial idea that
truth is a function of reality. But I shall argue that the idea that truth is
grounded commits us to the idea that truths are made true by entities.
So, can one really maintain that truth is determined by reality without
maintaining that there are truthmakers? In other words, can one really
maintain that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by how things
are but not by whether things are?
Suppose the proposition that the rose is red is made true by how the rose is.
But the rose is not only red: it is also light, soft, fragrant, long, thin, etc. This is
how the rose is. But if being how it is is what makes the proposition that the
rose is red true, being how it is, is also what makes the proposition that the
rose is light true, the proposition that the rose is fragrant true, and so on.
But this is wrong. For what makes true that the rose is red is not what
makes true that the rose is light. What makes true that the rose is red is that
it is red, while what makes true that the rose is light is that it is light. The
idea that truth is determined by reality is the idea that different truths are
determined by different portions of reality, or by different features of reality,
and so different truths about the same subject matter are determined by
different features of the subject matter in question.
So the rose is many ways. One way the rose is, is to be red; another way
the rose is, is to be light, and so on. Once we have distinguished different
ways the rose is, we can say that the proposition that the rose is red is true in
virtue of the rose’s being a certain way, namely being red, while the pro-
position that the rose is light is true in virtue of the rose’s being a different
way, namely being light. If so, what makes true a certain predication of the
rose is a certain way the rose is.
But to distinguish ways presupposes that we can identify them, count
them, and quantify over them. But if one can identify, count, and quantify
over ways, then ways exist. That is, ways, which are truthmakers, are
entities. So we are back to (TM), which claims that true propositions are
made true by entities, and which entails that truth supervenes upon whether
things are.10
10 This argument may remind one of an argument for possible worlds once advanced by Lewis.
Lewis argued roughly like this: it is uncontroversially true that things could have been different in
many ways; ordinary language permits the existentially quantified paraphrase: there are many
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But perhaps one can account for what makes the proposition that the rose
is red true without reifying ways? It might be thought that one could say that
the proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose instantiates the
property of being red, while the proposition that the rose is light is true
because the rose instantiates the property of being light. And one could insist
that this does not mean that there is an entity over and above the rose, the
properties of being red and of being light, and the instantiation relation. If
so, the rose can be said to be many different ways because it instantiates
many different properties, but ways are not a kind of entity, and there are no
entities that make any propositions true.
But this only helps if for the rose to instantiate the property of being red is
not for it to instantiate the property of being light. And this should not mean
that there is an entity, the-rose-instantiating-being-red, distinct from another
entity, the-rose-instantiating-being-light. For that means reifying how things
are. And reifying how things are is admitting truthmakers.
But if it does not mean that, what does it mean? It might simply mean
that the rose could have been red without being light and vice versa. If so,
how the rose is could have made true that the rose is red without making
true that the rose is light, and vice versa. But this is irrelevant, for the
problem is not to account for the fact that what makes true the propositions
that the rose is red and that the rose is light could have made true either but
not both of them. The problem is to account for the fact that the proposi-
tions that the rose is red and that the rose is light are, in the actual world,
made true by different features of reality without reifying those features.
Some might suggest that, since there are possible worlds in which the
proposition that the rose is red is true and the proposition that the rose is
light is false and vice versa, the rose’s being red consists simply in that the
actual world is one of the worlds where the rose is red, and the rose’s being
light consists simply in that the actual world is one of the worlds where the
ways things could have been besides the way they actually are; permissible paraphrases of truths
are true; therefore, there are many ways things could have been, i.e. there are many possible worlds
(Lewis 1973: 84). But my argument is not like this. Firstly, I do not appeal to permissible para-
phrases. Secondly, argue for the claim that the rose is many ways: for unless the rose is many
different ways we get the result that what makes true that the rose is red is the same as what makes
true that the rose is light, which is wrong.
One might think that although strictly different from Lewis’s argument, mine fails for the same
reasons as his. For, it will be said, what besets Lewis’s argument is that it does not follow from the
fact that things could have been different ways that there are possible worlds. But what does not
follow is that there are possible worlds understood a` la Lewis, i.e. sums of concrete entities. It does
follow, however, that there are ways things could have been. These ways could be uninstantiated
abstract properties, sets of propositions, etc. In each case these ways are entities. And all I need for
my argument to go through is that the ways the rose is, which make propositions about the rose
true, are entities. This follows from the fact that the rose is many ways. Thus my argument does
not fail in the way Lewis’s does. But what kind of entities (facts, tropes, etc.) ways are is something
I shall not discuss here.
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rose is light. If so, that truths are made true by how things are means, in
the case of the rose, that both the proposition that the rose is red and the
proposition that the rose is light are made true by how the world is, since it
is both one of the worlds where the rose is red and one of the worlds where
the rose is light. This amounts to saying that the truth about the rose, and
the truth about everything, is determined by how theworld is. But this is not
satisfactory, for it does not account for the idea that truth is determined by
subject matter since according to it all truths, whatever their subject matter,
are determined by how the world is.
It may be said that this position still makes room for the idea that truth is
determined by subject matter. For the truth of the proposition that the rose
is red is determined by how the world is, namely by the world’s being one of
the worlds where the rose is red, and this in turn is determined by how the
rose is. But how the rose is also determines that the world is one where the
rose is light, the rose is fragrant, etc. Thus this does not avoid the false idea
that the propositions that the rose is red, that the rose is light, that the rose is
fragrant, etc., are all true in virtue of the same, namely how the rose is.
7. WHY TRUTHMAKERS, II
Thus I cannot see how one could maintain that the propositions that the rose
is red and that the rose is light are true in virtue of different features of
reality without reifying those features and thereby introducing truthmakers.
But perhaps some are willing to insist that all inessential predications about
the rose are made true by, or merely supervene upon, how the rose is. Still, a
commitment to truthmakers is unavoidable, provided one accepts that truth
is grounded in reality, as the following argument shows:
(1) Truth is grounded.
(2) Grounding is a relation.
(3) Relations link entities.
(4) Therefore, truth is grounded in entities.
I have stated the argument in a slogan-like fashion to facilitate discussion of
the key premises. But a brief gloss will suffice to make clear exactly how the
argument must be taken. The import of the second premise is that to be
grounded is to be a relatum (of the grounding relation). Since the import of
the first premise is that every true proposition is grounded, it follows that for
every true proposition to be grounded is for it to be a relatum of the relation
of grounding. The import of the third premise is that all relata of a given
relation are entities. It follows that the grounding relation links some entities
to true propositions. The entities linked by the grounding relation to true
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propositions are their grounds.11 Therefore true propositions are grounded
in entities, i.e. truth is grounded in entities.
The argument is valid and I have already argued for the first premise of
the argument. And as I have said, even people like Quine and Horwich are
prepared to accept the first premise. This is surely because they believe they
can accept it without accepting truthmakers. But given this argument, any
one who wants to maintain premise (1) while denying the conclusion (4),
will have to find fault with either premise (2), or premise (3), or both.
Premise (3) is undeniable. It says about relations what the following claim
says about properties: properties are had or instantiated by entities. Even
Platonists, who believe properties can exist uninstantiated, will agree that if
a property is instantiated, it is instantiated by an entity. Surely if a relation is
instantiated, if it links anything to anything, then there are some things that
it links, and so it links entities. This point is generally recognized. Mellor
(1995: 156), for instance, says that for ‘Obd’ to be a relational statement, b
and d must exist, ‘since nothing relates anything to nothing’.
This leaves premise (2), which I take to be the favourite target of the foes
of truthmakers. But I shall now argue that premise (2) is also true.
As we saw, the proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is
red, but it is not the case that the rose is red because the proposition that the
rose is red is true. In general, hpi is true because p but it is not the case that p
because hpi is true. Thus if grounding is a relation then it is an asymmetrical
relation. This asymmetrical relation, which we report when we say that the
proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red, holds between
a true proposition and a thing in the world, e.g. the fact that the rose is red,
in virtue of which the proposition is true. The relation in question, which
holds between certain entities in the world and propositions, is no other
than that of making true, or that of being true in virtue of.
If grounding is a relation, then truth is a relational property of proposi-
tions.12 Relational properties are those that are had in virtue of an entity’s
bearing a certain relation to some thing or things. Thus DiegoMaradona has
the relational property of being famous in virtue of a relation that links him
to themillions who have heard of him. Likewise, truth is a relational property
that is had by a proposition in virtue of bearing a certain relation to a certain
entity, its truthmaker. This does not mean that being a relation is part of the
11 Nothing in the slogan-like argument corresponds to this claim. This is because the claim that
what the grounding relation links to true propositions are their grounds is controversial only to the
extent that the claims that grounding is a relation and that relations link entities are controversial.
Once these claims, which I shall discuss and defend below, have been granted the claim that what
the grounding relation links to true propositions are their grounds is obvious.
12 This is why the truthmaker principle is often associated with the correspondence theory of
truth. For the correspondence theory of truth makes truth a relational property based on the
relation of correspondence between a truthbearer and a worldly item—normally a fact.
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meaning of the truth predicate. All it means is that it applies in virtue of a
relation obtaining between that to which it applies and something else.
But if grounding is not a relation—what is it? That is, how can the truth of
the proposition that the rose is red be grounded in the rose’s being red if
grounding is not a relation?What is it, then, for the proposition that the rose
is red to be true because the rose is red?
One thing it could be said is that for the truth of the proposition that
the rose is red to be grounded in the rose’s being red is for that proposition to
be true if and only if the rose is red. But this is wrong, for it does not respect
the asymmetry of grounding. Indeed, if all it takes for the proposition that
the rose is red to be grounded in the rose’s being red is that it is true if and
only if the rose is red, then we should conclude that the rose’s being red is no
less grounded in the truth of the proposition than the truth of the pro-
position is grounded in the rose’s being red.
Another thing it could be said is that for the truth of a proposition to
be grounded is for the truth of the proposition to be deducible from, and
therefore explainable by, premises including the truth condition of the
proposition. For instance, from a premise stating that the rose is red, by
using the T-biconditionals, we deduce, and thereby explain, that the pro-
position that the rose is red is true. This is the line taken by Paul Horwich
(1998: 105).
But this is wrong. For deducibility does not amount to explanation.
Indeed, using the T-biconditionals we can also deduce from a premise
stating that the proposition that the rose is red is true that the rose is red. But
neither is the rose’s being red grounded in the proposition’s being true, nor
do we explain that the rose is red in terms of the truth of the proposition that
the rose is red.
It might be suggested that the rose’s being red explains the truth of the
proposition that the rose is red because certain counterfactuals hold: if the
rose had not been red then the proposition that the rose is red would not
have been true.
But this is wrong. First, that the relevant counterfactuals hold is simply
that they are true. And so this approach attempts to explain truth by truth,
which is not very illuminating. Second, that if the proposition that the rose is
red had not been true then the rose would not have been red is no less true
than that if the rose had not been red the proposition that the rose is red
would not have been true. So that the rose’s being red explains that the
proposition that the rose is red is true cannot be a mere matter of certain
counterfactuals holding. For the relevant counterfactuals hold in both
directions.
But perhaps saying that the proposition that the rose is red is true because
the rose is red simply means that we explain the truth of the proposition in
terms of the rose’s being red rather than the other way round? According to
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this, the proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red
because we explain the former in terms of the latter. But this is wrong. We
explain the truth of the proposition that the rose is red in terms of the rose’s
being red because the proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose
is red. Explanation is not and does not account for grounding—on the
contrary, grounding is what makes possible and ‘grounds’ explanation.
Not only that. As David-Hillel Ruben says, what makes explanation
possible is the presence of certain determinative relations between entities
(Ruben 1990: 210). He puts it like this: ‘explanations work only because
things make things happen or make things have some feature’ (Ruben 1990:
232). So invoking explanation of the truth of the proposition that the rose is
red will not save us from postulating a relation (namely grounding) between
some entity and the proposition.
But, one might say, all there is behind the fact that the proposition that
the rose is red is true because the rose is red is a move of semantic descent.
Consider, for instance, the view that the truth predicate is simply a dis-
quotational device. Here the function of the truth predicate is not to ascribe
a property to something but simply to cancel linguistic reference so that
reference to objects like the rose is restored. So to say that ‘The rose is red’ is
true is simply to say that the rose is red.
In the same pages where he was putting forward the disquotational view,
Quine admitted that truth is grounded: ‘No sentence is true but reality
makes it so’ (Quine 1970: 10). Can Quine account for the groundedness of
truth without making grounding a relation? It might be thought he can: all it
takes for ‘The rose is red’ to be true because the rose is red is that given that
the rose is red we can legitimately apply the disquotational device to ‘The
rose is red’.
Quine’s view is meant to apply to sentences rather than propositions,
which I assumed as truthbearers at the beginning of this paper. But some-
thing like it could be modelled for propositions. One could simply say that
the function of the truth predicate is to cancel propositional reference in
order to restore reference to non-propositional objects or entities. So to say
that the proposition that the rose is red is true is simply to say that the rose is
red. The truth predicate thus functions as a mere device of semantic descent.
And, it might be thought, the proponent of this view will say that all it takes
for the proposition that the rose is red to be true because the rose is red is
that given that the rose is red we can legitimately apply the device of
semantic descent to the proposition that the rose is red.
Maybe that is the point of the truth predicate. The predicate is useful
because it allows us to indirectly speak about the world even in cases when,
due to certain technicalities, we must perform semantic ascent. Paraphrasing
Quine (1970: 12), by calling the proposition true, we call the rose red.
Perhaps that is what we do and what we need the truth predicate for.
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But that this view accounts for the idea that the proposition that the rose
is red is true because the rose is red is illusory. This view gets the order of
explanation wrong: that the proposition that the rose is red is true because
the rose is red accounts for the fact that given that the rose is red we can
legitimately apply the device of semantic descent to the proposition that the
rose is red—not the other way around.
But, it might be said, the importance of semantic descent lies in that it
allows us to speak about what we really want to talk about: the world of
roses, snow, and cats. As Quine said, the truth predicate ‘serves as a
reminder that though [propositions] are mentioned, reality is still the whole
point’ (1970: 11).13 This is surely true, but one should avoid trying to
explain that the proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red
in terms of our interests in roses rather than propositions. That we are
interested in roses rather than propositions about them does not explain
why propositions about roses are grounded in roses. The more likely thing is
that the fact that the rose’s being red grounds the truth of the proposition
that the rose is red plays some part, even if a modest one, in an explanation
of why we are more interested in roses than in propositions about them.
One might try to reject the idea that grounding is a relation from the
identity theory of truth, according to which true propositions are facts. One
could argue thus: (a) what grounds the true proposition that the rose is red is
the fact that the rose is red; (b) the true proposition that the rose is red¼ the
fact that the rose is red; (c) if a relation, grounding is an irreflexive relation
(at least in the case of propositions about non-truthbearers like roses);
therefore, (d) grounding is not a relation (at least in the case of propositions
about non-truthbearers like roses).14
The problem with this argument lies in the conjunction of (a) and (b),
which leads to the abandonment of premise (1) of my argument, i.e. to the
abandonment of the idea that truth is grounded. For (a) and (b) entail that
the proposition that the rose is red is true because it is fact that the rose is
red, and that it is a fact that the rose is red because the proposition that the
rose is red is true. This, as we saw in x5, is absurd and represents an
abandonment of the idea that truth is grounded.
It might be replied that this sounds absurd because one is implicitly
presupposing that the proposition and the fact that the rose is red are not the
13 The bracketed word ‘propositions’ replaces Quine’s word ‘sentences’.
14 I am not claiming that the identity theory of truth is committed per se to claims (a) and (c) in
the argument. An identity theorist could maintain that grounding is a reflexive relation, or that
truth is not grounded, or that truth is not grounded in facts (e.g. that truths about the rose are
grounded in tropes of the rose, or in how the rose is. The latter is very close to Dodd’s view that
truths about the rose supervene upon how the rose is, and Dodd is an identity theorist of truth (see
his 2000)). The only premise of this argument the identity theory is committed per se is (b). All
I am doing here is devising an argument against the idea that grounding is a relation that is based
on the identity theory of truth.
29Why Truthmakers
same entity. But, the objector will say, given that the fact and the pro-
position are one and the same, there is no absurdity in claiming that the
proposition that the rose is red is true because it is a fact that the rose is red,
and that it is a fact that the rose is red because the proposition that the rose is
red is true. For given the identity between proposition and fact one is not
thereby claiming of two entities that they are mutually grounded. So, the
objector will continue, all (a) and (b) entail is that a true proposition is
grounded in itself.
But this is abandoning the idea that truth is grounded, for it amounts to
taking truth as primitive. The proposition that the rose is red is true because
it is a fact that the rose is red, but given the identity theory of truth this
amounts to saying that it is true because it is true. That it is true is then a
primitive fact about the proposition that the rose is red. Saying that the
proposition that the rose is red is grounded in itself, and saying that it is not
grounded, are one and the same thing.
We can see more clearly the errors that an identity theorist incurs in
conjoining (a) and (b). There are two versions of the identity theory, a
modest one and a robust one (Dodd 1999c: 227). A robust identity theory
takes facts to be entities from the realm of reference whose totality makes up
the world. If the world is the totality of facts, they must have things, and
perhaps also properties, as their constituents. But if so, given the identity
between proposition and fact, what makes the rose red is that the pro-
position that the rose is red is true, which is absurd.15
A modest identity theory takes facts to be entities in the Fregean realm of
sense. We do not encounter facts in the world of roses, atoms, houses, and
people—facts are not made up of these things. On this version of the identity
theory to say that the true proposition that the rose is red is grounded in the
fact that the rose is red, i.e. to say that the proposition is grounded in itself
means to deny that the proposition is grounded in anything about the rose.
The modest identity theory, when coupled with the idea that true proposi-
tions are grounded in facts, leads to the view that the truth of the pro-
position about the rose is independent from the rose’s being red. This is also
clearly wrong.
Thus it is difficult to see what grounding could be if not a relation. But it is
easy to see that it is a relation. For consider again the proposition that the
rose is red. If the truth predicate applies to it, then it applies in virtue of, or is
grounded in, something. Either it is grounded in an intrinsic feature of the
15 This absurdity is a manifestation of a more basic absurdity of robust identity theories, namely
their identification of facts, understood as having things (and perhaps properties) as constituents,
and propositions, understood as thinkables, which are entities of different ontological categories.
This absurdity is also at the root of the difficulties robust identity theories find in accounting for
falsehood. Dodd (1999c: 227) sees a robust identity theory in Hornsby (1997), but Hornsby
(1999: 242) rejects the charge.
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proposition, or it is grounded in something else. If it is grounded in an
intrinsic feature of the proposition then we lose the connection between
truth and the world and we are left with some version of primitive truth—
something I have already rejected. So it is grounded in something else. So the
proposition and that something else that grounds it are related—if they were
not related, how could one be true in virtue of the other? And the way in
which they are related is that one grounds the other. Therefore grounding is
a relation.
8. CONCLUSION
As I have said, analytic truths and some other truths, are not grounded.
But the idea that most synthetic truths, including inessential predications
about things like roses, cats, planets, and molecules, are grounded is a very
plausible idea that most philosophers want to retain. But there is no escape
from truthmakers once the groundedness of truth has been admitted. It is
not possible to maintain that truth is grounded in how things are without
maintaining that truth is grounded in whether things are. Thus (TM) and the
idea that truths have truthmakers have been vindicated.
The idea that truths have truthmakers has important and problematic
ontological consequences. Not only does one have to admit an extra entity,
over and above the rose, to account for what makes true that the rose is
red—one also has to find a truthmaker, for instance, for negative existential
truths, like the truth that there are no penguins in the Northern Pole. What
that truthmaker is, I don’t claim to know. All I claim is that there must
be one.16
16 Versions of this paper were read at a conference in the University of Manchester in 2002, a
seminar in Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, a seminar in Oxford, and a colloquium at Bariloche,
Argentina. I thank those audiences. I thank the Leverhulme Trust, whose generous Philip
Leverhulme Prize made possible to complete this paper. Finally, I also thank the Philosophy
Department at CUNY, where I started writing this paper in 2001, and Universidad Torcuato Di
Tella, where I finished it in 2002.
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